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ABSTRACT—The anatomy of the nonhuman primate vocal
tract is not fundamentally different from the human one.
Notwithstanding, nonhuman primates are remarkably un-
skillful at controlling vocal production and at combining
basic call units into more complex strings. Instead, their
vocal behavior is linked to specific psychological states,
which are evoked by events in their social or physical
environment. Humans are the only primates that have
evolved the ability to produce elaborate and willfully con-
trolled vocal signals, although this may have been a fairly
recent invention. Despite their expressive limitations, non-
human primates have demonstrated a surprising degree
of cognitive complexity when responding to other individ-
uals’ vocalizations, suggesting that, as recipients, crucial
linguistic abilities are part of primate cognition. Pivotal
aspects of language comprehension, particularly the abil-
ity to process semantic content, may thus be part of our
primate heritage. The strongest evidence currently comes
from Old World monkeys, but recent work indicates that
these capacitiesmayalso be present in our closest relatives,
the chimpanzees.
KEYWORDS—primate cognition; evolution of language; vo-
cal communication
The evolution of language poses one of the great problems of
modern science. Comparative studies of communication in ani-
mals, particularly nonhuman primates, are playing an increas-
ingly important role in what has become a truly interdisciplinary
endeavor (e.g. Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch 2002). One key as-
sumption is that, by investigating the communicative abilities of
our closest living relatives, it may be possible to identify im-
portant physical and behavioral adaptations that made it possible
for language to evolve in humans. Studies of primate vocal
communication may reveal how humans’ common ancestors with
other living primates communicated and how and why human
language originated from those early forms of communication.
The mechanisms with which living nonhuman primates produce
and perceive vocalizations, as well as the underlying cognitive
processes of these mechanisms, are thus of particular scientific
interest.
PHYLOGENETIC ROOTS OFACOUSTIC FLEXIBILITY
Among the 250 primate species, humans have exceptional vocal
abilities. From early on, young children produce a rich array of
sounds, a manifestation of their potent urge to engage in social
activities, obtain goods, and affect the behavior of other people.
The International Phonetic Alphabet lists over 100 acoustically
unique phones, the most basic sound units of human speech and
the acoustic basis for the world’s 6,000 languages. These basic
sound units are rarely produced singly, but are commonly com-
bined into rapid sequences, which serve as the main carriers of
meaning. These two characteristics—a rich acoustic portfolio
and the predisposition to combine basic units into more complex
acoustic strings—appear to be uniquely human traits, and call
for an evolutionary investigation. Why are humans different from
the other primates in their vocal abilities?
One explanation has been provided by research on psycho-
logical differences between human and nonhuman primates.
Various studies have shown that, when vocalizing, nonhuman
primates do not actively or intentionally try to inform one another,
probably because they are unaware of each other’s mental states
(Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003). For example, in the presence of a
predator, mother vervet monkeys do not attempt to alert ignorant
offspring more than knowledgeable ones. Nonhuman primates
vocalize in response to important events, irrespective of how
potential recipients may view the situation. Humans are clearly
different in this respect. People take each other’s mental states
into account and perceive behavior as caused by beliefs, desires,
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or knowledge. Although nonhuman primates probably experi-
ence a rich array of mental states, they do not seem to appreciate
that their own experience may differ from that of other individ-
uals. This cognitive limitation is likely to make their social world
much less complex than that of humans. Moreover, it may also
remove a powerful selection pressure to evolve more complex and
flexible vocal abilities. Without the perceived need to share
mental states, there are considerably fewer incentives for com-
munication.
Nevertheless, various lines of research have demonstrated that
nonhuman primate vocal behavior is much less rigid than has
been thought. Vocal flexibility often remains hidden during
routine life for nonhuman primates, only manifesting itself under
specific circumstances, particularly after changes in the social
fabric of a group. For example, observations at various zoos have
shown that, over time, male chimpanzees may converge on
acoustically unique pant-hoot vocalizations that are unique to
particular zoos. In marmosets, the acoustic structure of certain
call types alters in response to changed social environments,
even during adulthood (Snowdon & de la Torre, 2002). Similarly,
if baboon males fall in rank, their calls shorten within a period of
months (Fischer, Kitchen, Seyfarth, & Cheney, 2004). In adult
Campbell’s monkeys, the acoustic structure of contact calls
changes with an individual’s social relations, and individuals
remember and distinguish past and present call variants of fa-
miliar group members (Lemasson, Hausberger, & Zuberbu¨hler,
2005). Although relatively difficult to detect, these and other
examples of vocalization changes demonstrate subtle flexibility
in adult vocal production in nonhuman primates. This flexibility
may have acted as an important pre-adaptation for the evolution
of modern humans’ speech capacities. In sum, the old dichotomy
of innately determined primate vocalizations and flexible human
speech is no longer accurate.
TRANSITIONS TO SPEECH
The basic anatomy and principles of sound production are the
same for all primates, although humans show a number of special
adaptations, particularly a permanently lowered larynx (Lie-
berman 2000). Sounds from the larynx enter the adjoining vocal
tract, where various structures that modify sound, such as the
lips, tongue, jaw, and other articulators, form constrictions that
determine the final acoustic structure of the vocal signal. Non-
human primates use the same mechanisms to produce calls, but
in a much less sophisticated manner (Riede, Bronson, Hat-
zikirou, & Zuberbu¨hler, 2005).
The main reason why humans are so skillful in vocal produc-
tion is that they have extraordinary motor control over their
articulators. Development of human facial and mouth control is
linked to a particular gene called FOXP2; damage to this gene
causes severe speech disorders (Marcus & Fisher 2003). Al-
though FOXP2 is found throughout the animal kingdom, the
human version is slightly different and is very young in evolu-
tionary terms; it did not become established in the human pop-
ulation until about 200,000 years ago (Enard et al., 2002). Given
this gene’s crucial role in speech production, one possible sce-
nario is that, before this time, our ancestors lacked modern
articulatory abilities or had abilities more resembling today’s
nonhumanprimates.A related implication is that older hominids,
including Homo erectus, were probably not able to produce
speech like modern humans. Thus human linguistic abilities
must have evolved as part of older communication systems, since
it is simply inconceivable that they evolved in just 200,000 years,
the equivalent of about 10,000 generations. Of particular interest
are semantic (meaning-related) and syntactic (rule-related)
abilities, as they are central to virtually every definition of lan-
guage.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES OF CALL PRODUCTION AND
COMPREHENSION
The first evidence for semantic competence in nonhuman pri-
mates came from studies on East African vervet monkeys. In this
species, individuals produce acoustically distinctive alarm calls
in response to at least five different types of predators. When
tape-recorded exemplars of these alarm calls were played back
from a hidden speaker, nearby listeners responded as if they had
spotted the corresponding predator themselves, suggesting that
the calls were meaningful to them (Seyfarth & Cheney 2003).
Meanwhile, comparable findings have also been reported from
other primates, notably West African Diana and Campbell’s
monkeys (Zuberbu¨hler 2003). However, the fact that monkeys
are capable of producing different types of alarm calls is not a
particularly exciting finding; it has been demonstrated in many
other groups of animals. Less well known are what sorts of mental
representations individual animals experience during call pro-
duction and perception. In some bird and ground squirrel spe-
cies, alarm calls may simply reflect the caller’s perception of the
degree of threat, rather than referring to a particular class of
predator. These threat-related factors, however, do not seem to
explain the use of alarm calls in nonhuman primates. For ex-
ample, Diana monkeys produce eagle alarm calls regardless of
whether the predator is close or far or whether it is likely to attack
from above or from the ground (Zuberbu¨hler 2005).
Concerning call comprehension, one central question is what
cognitive processes are activated when nonhuman primates lis-
ten to the calls of other individuals. For example, when hearing a
leopard alarm call, do monkeys simply respond to the physical
features of the call or are they capable of generating a mental
representation of a leopard? One way of teasing apart these two
possibilities under field conditions is to expose animals to se-
quences of calls that differ both in acoustic structure and in the
underlying meaning—so-called habituation–dishabituation ex-
periments. The results of one such experiment are shown in
Figure 1: In Diana monkeys, individuals are indeed able to attend
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to the associated semantic content rather than simply responding
to the acoustic features of calls.
Compared to the evolution of semantic abilities, the evolution
of syntax is less well understood. Languages are grounded in
phonological and syntactic rules, which enable speakers to
construct an infinite number of messages from a finite group of
sounds. During the first few years of their lives, and with vast
amounts of exposure, children gradually learn to extract the
syntactic rules of their native language and start applying them
correctly (Tomasello 2003).
Given that our linguistic abilities may have old evolutionary
roots, is there anyevidence for syntax inprimatecommunication?
In one study, cotton-top tamarins’ ability to extract rules from
artificial auditory patterns was not particularly impressive (Fitch
& Hauser 2004). However, when signals are communicatively
relevant, nonhuman primates have demonstrated some under-
standing of simple syntactic rules. For example, wild Campbell’s
monkeys can produce sequences of calls consisting of different
types of vocalizations. Experiments have shown that the ordering
of the calls determines the meaning of the entire sequence; that
is, the meaning of the sequence is not merely a blending of the
individual calls’ meanings (Zuberbu¨hler 2003).
Nonhuman primates routinely use their knowledge of their
world when responding to other individuals’ vocalizations. A
number of illustrative examples have been provided in the con-
text of communication between species. For example, crested
guinea fowls are ground-dwelling forest birds that are hunted by a
variety of predators, including leopards and humans; in response
to such threats, the birds produce a single type of alarm call that
covers all ground predators. Diana monkeys gauge their vocal
response to the birds’ alarm calls depending on the most likely
cause for the calls—that is, whether the birds called in response
to a leopard or a human—rather than responding to the alarm
calls themselves (Zuberbu¨hler 2003). The monkeys responded
with many alarm calls of their own if a leopard was the likely
cause, while they remained mostly quiet if a human was the likely
cause (Zuberbu¨hler 2003). Humans hunt monkeys with shotguns
and the most adaptive response for a monkey is to hide silently.
When the monkeys are confronted with a nearby group of
chimpanzees—dangerous predators that hunt monkeys in the
trees—their best response is to flee and hide silently. Chim-
panzees are sometimes attacked by leopards, and if that happens,
individuals often respond with loud alarm screams. In one ex-
periment, Diana monkeys heard recordings of chimpanzee alarm
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Diana Leopard Alarm --> Eagle Fig. 1. Field experiment to investigate whether primates are able to
process the semantic properties associated with alarm calls. Wild groups of
Diana monkeys in the Taı¨ forest, Ivory Coast, were first exposed to a prime
stimulus,either a predatorvocalization (e.g. shrieksof a crownedeagle; top
condition) or a conspecific’s alarm call (e.g. Diana eagle or leopard alarms;
middle and bottom conditions). Five minutes later, the same group heard a
probe stimulus, a predator vocalization (e.g., eagle shrieks) that either did
or did not correspond to the previous alarm call. (The study included three
additional conditions, not depicted here, in which leopard growls were used
instead of eagle shrieks.) Results showed that the semantic content of the
prime stimuli, not their acoustic features alone, explained the response
patterns of the monkeys: Predator vocalizations did not elicit new alarm
calls when monkeys were previously primed with the alarm call corre-
spondingto thatpredator(middlecondition), butdidelicitalarmcallswhen
thepreviousalarmcall hadbeenfora differentpredator (bottomcondition;
Zuberbu¨hler 2003). Copyright (c) 1999 by the American Psychological
Association. Adapted with permission.
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studied abandoned their default response to chimpanzees (hiding
silently) and instead began to produce conspicuous leopard
alarm calls of their own, as if they assumed the presence of a
leopard. Groups whose home range was in the core area of a
resident chimpanzee community were significantly more likely
to respond this way than were peripheral groups. Presumably,
peripheral groups had less experience with chimpanzee alarm
screams and, due to their less developed discrimination abilities,
were more likely to hide silently in response to any type of
chimpanzee vocalization. These data further underscore the
general point that primates do not respond directly to the acoustic
features of vocal signals but to the pragmatic circumstances
under which calls are produced—in this case, the likely cause of
the calls (Zuberbu¨hler 2005).
VOCAL COMMUNICATION IN GREATAPES
The studies reviewed so far all involve various monkey species.
Currently, comparable data from the natural communication of
apes are conspicuously lacking. This is particularly puzzling
given the apes’ close evolutionary link to humans and their well-
established skills in acquiring artificial communication systems
(e.g. sign language). Recent work suggests that some important
facts may have been overlooked, though. For example, wild
chimpanzees have been documented to produce different types of
barks depending on the environmental context (Crockford &
Boesch, 2003). Wild chimpanzees also produce different types of
screams depending on the social role they are playing during a
conflict; these different screams may provide important infor-
mation for nearby allies and relatives (Slocombe & Zuberbu¨hler,
2005). More systematic experimental work is needed to deter-
mine whether apes use vocalizations to convey information about
events in their environment the way monkeys have been dem-
onstrated to do.
CONCLUSION
Studies of nonhuman primate vocal abilities play a key role in
understanding human language evolution. Humans share a long
evolutionary history with the nonhuman primates and compara-
tive research has revealed a number of important similarities and
differences. In terms of vocal production, humans are unique in
their superior ability to rapidly change the geometry of their vocal
tracts, the biological basis of complex speech utterances. Al-
though nonhuman primates can produce many of the mouth and
face maneuvers required for complex articulation, their overall
performance is slow and unimpressive. These differences be-
tween human and nonhuman primates in mouth and face control
have been linked to genetic differences, although there are also
important differences in social intelligence. Humans appear to
be the only primates that are aware of each other’s mental states,
creating a social reality of high complexity that may have gen-
erated intense selection pressure for elaborate communicative
skills.
Nonhuman primates perform much better in comprehension-
related tasks. Some basic linguistic capacities, such as the ability
to assign meaning to arbitrary sounds and the ability to adjust
meaning as a function of simple rules, are part of primate cog-
nition. These linguistically important abilities must thus be very
old, having emerged in the primate lineage long before the advent
of modern humans. Future work will have to determine whether
primate semantic signals and human speech are processed by
related brain structures.
One problem with the comparative literature is that strong
evidence is only available for monkeys, while the natural vocal
abilities of apes are still understudied. Some observational work
with chimpanzees points to comparable abilities, but there is a
clear need for experimental work of great-ape vocal communi-
cation, given their importance as living links to human evolution.
Finally, meaningful progress on primate communication and
cognition will largely depend on whether research questions can
be addressed in an ecologically and socially relevant context—
that is, with individuals interacting with each other in their
natural environments. Yet, the survival of the world’s primates is
severely threatened by human activity, directly by the bush meat
trade and habitat destruction and indirectly by international
agricultural practices. Scientific progress in understanding our
cognitive past is closely tied to the survival of these species in
their natural habitats.
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